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I. Abstract 
 
While the European Sovereign Debt crisis presented unprecedented challenges to the European 
institutions in addressing the vulnerabilities of its financial sector, it gave rise to the effective 
cooperation between the European Commissions, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), collectively known as the Troika.  This paper reviews the 
interactions between the IMF and the euro area official lenders in three programme countries: 
Greece, Portugal, and Ireland.  A close examination of the lending terms changes revealed an 
evolving understanding of the crisis by the European institutions.  This paper analyzes the impact 
that the IMF had on the lending term changes to enrich a better understanding of the evolution of 
the European crisis management framework.    
II. Introduction 
 
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is a permanent bailout program established in 
2012 by the European Union to succeed previous temporary financial programs such as 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in response to the European debt crisis.  The ESM 
has motivated a lot of scholarly debate regarding the need for its existence, optimal size and 
lending capacity, economic governance setup, and sustainability in the long-term.  Most of the 
existing literature focuses on the framework and future viability of the ESM as a crisis 
management vehicle in the European monetary union.  Less scholarly attention has been given to 
the previous temporary financial programs and the drivers behind their evolution.   
This paper examines the institutional interactions between the euro area official lenders 
and the International Monetary Union (IMF).  By comparing the similarities and divergence in 
the lending terms between the IMF rescue packages and EFSF/ESM programmes, the paper 
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analyzes the drivers, conditions, and mechanisms that ultimately led to the development of a 
eurozone specific permanent crisis management framework, and equally importantly, the role 
that the IMF played in the process.  The paper will begin with a background overview of 
eurozone debt crisis in order to illustrate the evolution of the eurozone’s crisis management 
capability.  A section on methodology will be followed by literature review that focuses on two 
parts: 1) scholarly discussions on the roles and interactions between the IMF and official 
eurozone lenders, 2) official reports on lending terms for three programme countries: Ireland, 
Greece, and Portugal. This paper will then draw implications and conclusions about the changes 
of lending terms of the IMF and eurozone rescue packages.  
 
III. Background of European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
 
Although the 2008 Global Financial Crisis started in the U.S. as a result of credit burst in 
the subprime mortgage markets, it impacted many parts of the world in varying degrees.  The 
euro area suffered non-negligible repercussion for many reasons due to it nature as a monetary 
union with coordinated currency and policies.  The euro area experienced a period of the collapse 
of financial institutions and high government debt, formally known as the European Sovereign 
Debt Crisis.  Vast research has been conducted on the causes of the eurozone crisis.  While 
scholars differ on the chronological order of importance of the causes, most agree that the crisis 
was caused and exaggerated by 1) years of unsustainable government macro-economic policies 
that had caused the build-up of deficits, fiscal imbalances, and debt burdens; 2) the lack of 
effective institutional means to control and manage crisis.  As the 2008 financial crisis first hit 
peripheral countries such as Ireland and Spain with large housing market booms, a sovereign 
debt crisis stroke through more countries with rising fiscal problems (Rabobank, 2015).  The 
5 
 
crisis began when the new Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou announced the country’s 
gross violation of the permissible deficit to GDP ratio (Sinha, 2018).  Heavy fiscal spending over 
years and failure to undertake reforms caused the dramatic downgrade of Greece’s credit rating 
by Fitch, Standard Poor’s and Moody’s in 2009 (ESM, 2019).  The inability of the Greek 
government to finance its debt on the market indicated the loss of investor confidence and 
inevitably triggered concerns of other peripheral member states in 2010 (Rabobank, 2015).  The 
crisis quickly spread to Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus, who were all unable to repay their 
government debt and needed assistance from third-party financial institutions in varying degrees.  
The European response to the euro area crisis at first followed the IMF approach, which 
uses lending facilities to preserve short-term financial stability, but then evolved into developing 
its own temporary and permanent crisis management frameworks.  The initial European response 
to the crisis was controversial as scholars and policymakers debated the scope, model, and goals 
of official lending (Corsetti, Erce and Uy, 2017).  In examining the learning development in the 
area of practical lending and programme implementation, Schwarz highlights that the initial ad 
hoc policy response of the European institutions to the debt crisis was considered highly lacking 
both in view of the crisis dynamics and the political economy of eurozone lending (Schwarz, 
2015).  The European Central Bank played an undisputable role in saving the banking sector at 
the beginning of the crisis, particularly mitigating the impact of reverse cross-border private 
capital flows through its long-term refinancing operations (Rabobank, 2015).  However, other 
sources of finance and rescue packages were desperately needed to specifically target the debt 
crisis and balance-in-payment crisis.  With endless nights of debates and discussions, Euro area 
leaders sought assistance form the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
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Scholarly sources disagree on how dependent Europe was on the IMF assistance: while 
the Eurozone official sources such as the ESM Evaluation Report and The Inside Story of the 
ESM both argue that Europe was never entirely dependent upon on it, Bruegel Blueprint and 
other sources that represent the IMF evaluation treat the participation of the IMF as actively 
needed and sought after.  As it later became an integral manager of the crisis, the IMF 
participated in five rescue packages jointly with the European Commission (EC) and the 
European Central Bank (ECB), forming the so-called “Troika” in 2010 (Schwarz, 2015).  
Ultimately, the euro area recognized the contagion threatened not only to peripheral member 
states, but also to the common currency, so it decided to establish its own firewall alongside the 
financial assistance provided by the IMF (ESM, 2019).  Signing the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) in June 2010, the eurozone countries came together to establish a temporary, yet 
lean and cost-efficient bailout fund that signals to the public European commitment to the 
preservation of the common currency with a €440 bn guarantee structure (ESM Evaluation 
Report).  The eurozone officials soon recognized the importance of creating a permanent entity 
that is more robust and credible than the EFSF (ESM Evaluation Report).  The European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) was thus created in 2010 and went into operation in 2012 to succeed 
its predecessor EFSF as a permanent bailout fund with key operations such as funding, lending, 
investment, risk, legal, policy, and other corporate functions (ESM Evaluation Report).  
Together, the EFSF and ESM have disbursed a total amount of €295 bn to five countries: Ireland, 
Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and Greece (ESM Website).  The success of EFSF and ESM in 
facilitating the European economic recovery is undeniable, but one ought to examine the effect 
of the two eurozone programmes considering the IMF participation in the crisis.  
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IV. Scope, Methodology and Data 
 
The focus of this paper is on the euro-area countries within the EU, as their situations 
represented a joint effort between the European institutions and the IMF.  There are three roles of 
distributing assistance within the IMF, namely “programme negotiation and monitoring,” 
“decision to assist,” and “lending” (IMF website).  Correspondingly, these three roles are 
assumed by many different parts of the European partners: the actual lending is conducted by 
EFSF/ESM, program negotiation is handled by EC and ECB and the ultimate decision to assist is 
made by the ESM Board of Governors (Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, Wolff, 2013).  Due to the 
unprecedented, complicated nature of the joint financial assistance programmes between the 
eurozone official lenders and the IMF, this paper only focuses on the lending role of the two 
institutions as it provides a direct comparison of the IMF and ESM frameworks.  
Three countries are selected: Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, which are the only euro 
countries that received bilateral assistance from the IMF and euro-area lenders.  In the case of 
Greece, the IMF is not involved in the Third Economic Adjustment Programme (commonly 
known as the third bailout package), so the paper excludes this from the analysis.1   
The data for analysis of the euro-area’s role comes from a variety of resources produced 
by the ESM.  In 2017, the ESM board appointed an independent evaluator to publish an 
EFSF/ESM Evaluation Report.  This report is one of the primary sources of data for packages 
disbursed from the EFSF/ESM.  Additional data for rescue programs from the EU sources are all 
provided on the ESM official website, which presents detailed descriptions of the financial 
 
1 European Council: “In the case of the third programme for Greece, the decision of the Fund to provide further 
financial support to Greece will depend on its assessment of the policy reforms that are undertaken and the public 
debt sustainability of the country.” https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/financial-assistance-eurozone-
members/greece-programme/# 
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assistance given to each programme country.  Following the 2017 ESM Evaluation Report, the 
ESM created a database that congregated a repository of data for the six types of financial 
assistance programmes that the EFSF and ESM funded between 2011 and 2018.  For each 
programme country, the repository provides numerical and visual data on lending information 
and programme overview.  Lending information consists of data related to loan disbursement, 
repayment, and interest and fees over time.  Specifically, tracking changes in terms such as 
interest rates drop and maturity extension over time will be helpful to analyze in comparison 
with changes in IMF lending terms.  
Since the end of 2009, the IMF was involved in the rescue process of the sovereign debt 
crisis by participating in the economic adjustment programs for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal.  In 
total, the IMF contributed around one third to the emergency funds in a “Troika” model with the 
European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB) (Seitz and Jost, 2012).  A 
significant source of data on the IMF involvement in the sovereign debt crisis will be secondary, 
coming from scholarly research.  Research has been conducted on why the IMF became involved 
in the eurozone crisis and how it coordinated the financial assistance with the eurozone lenders.   
For example, discussion paper from the IMF website “The Role of the IMF in the European Debt 
Crisis” by Franz Seitz and Thomas Jost provides a detailed overview of the rescue packages and 
the involvement of the IMF during the crisis.  The main part of the article discusses the pros and 
cons of the participation of the IMF in elaborating and monitoring the economic adjustment 
programs for the countries in crisis.  Seitz and Jost argue that by participating in the sovereign 
debt crisis, the IMF was able to continue carrying out its mission, as many observers doubted the 
necessity of the IMF due to its low ending before 2017 and 2018 (Sietz and Jost, 2012).  Lastly, 
scholarly work on lending term changes have provided valuable data for the construction of 
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graphs and tables in this study.  The authors of  "Official Sector Lending Strategies During the 
Euro Area Crisis" collected data for interest rates built by modifying the time series provided 
through the ESM website to repayment profiles for EFSF and ESM loans as of the end of 2016 
(Corsetti, Erce & Uy, 2017). 
 
V. Research Motivation and Questions 
 
In researching the European sovereign debt crisis, this study noticed that scholarly 
debates not only reveal the fundamental issues regarding fiscal coordination among Eurozone 
members, but also the complicated relationship between the IMF and European institutions 
during the long crisis resolution process.  Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, and Wolff published an early 
assessment of the EU-IMF cooperation in specifically Greece, Ireland and Portugal.  They 
concluded that the joint programmes have largely benefited all three countries from the 
perspective of the current account deficit shrinking, but economic and social problems remained 
severe by the time of the study (Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, Wolff, 2013).  The authors argued 
qualitatively that the participation of the IMF was very necessary as the EU lenders lacked 
expertise, but the IMF took on a more operationally involved role than desired and sustainable 
(Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, Wolff, 2013).  Pisani-Ferry et al represent a group of scholars who studied 
the IMF-EU cooperation as a potential template for future global and regional financial 
cooperation.  Other scholars such as Nicolas Veron took the IMF side of argument, arguing that 
the IMF generated major positive impact and claiming that the euro-area was not prepared for 
handling a crisis of this nature and scale (Veron, 2016). 
This paper therefore aims to contribute to existing literature on the interactions between 
the IMF and the euro area official lenders during the euro area crisis.  In examining how the 
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lending terms have changed for each EFSF/ESM and IMF programme, this paper analyzes the 
impact that the IMF had on those changes and divergences to enrich a better understanding of the 
evolution of the European crisis management framework.  The goal of the research is to examine 
the changes and whether the IMF played a role in the process.  
 
V. Discussion 
 
Greece Overview 
Although the Hungarian program in October 2008 was the first joint EU/IMF program 
during the financial crisis, Greece set a milestone as it was the first eurozone member country to 
receive bilateral support from both institutions.  In cooperating with the IMF in providing loans 
to Hungary, the EU was able to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of its own organizational 
expertise and develop guidelines for joint programs (Seitz & Jost).  The efficiency of the 
institutional framework in the EU was soon tested by the financial situations of its eurozone 
members.  In October 2009, the Greek government adjusted its projection of the 2009 budget 
deficit from 3.7% to 12.5% of GDP, marking the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis (EEAG 
Report, 2011).  When Greece initially informed the European officials about its financial 
condition and indicated need for help, there was no formalized blueprint for a recovery strategy, 
besides requesting the Greek government to carry out fiscal reforms.  As the market confidence 
continued to worsen over the next few months, Greece officially requested help in early 2010 
and the euro area partners agreed to involve the IMF.  The Troika provided the first economic 
adjustment program to Greece to focus on its high public debt and failing domestic economy.  
Totaling 110 billion EUR, the Greek programme marks the first financial collaboration between 
the IMF and the euro area members for an eurozone member during the crisis (Table 1).  
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It is important to point out that Greece received financial assistance from the euro area 
institutions in the form of bilateral loans from many countries.  At the time of the first Greek 
assistance program, the EU countries had not yet established a systematic assistance framework.  
Soon after the EU announced collaboration with the IMF for Greece, it established two funds 
with a total of 500 billion EUR, namely the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism 
(EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).  While the EFSM was set up as a 
lending facility similar to that previously used for non-euro countries like Hungary and Latvia, 
the EFSF was established as a temporary, special purpose vehicle to make loans to euro area 
countries other than Greece.  It was not until March 2011 that the EU decided to create a 
permanent rescue fund named the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to replace the 
temporary EFSF starting in 2013.  These changes in the form of institutional support reflected 
the attitude change of the euro area officials towards the nature of the crisis. 
Ireland Overview 
The origin of Ireland’s problems was a quite different story than that of Greece.  
Triggered by the combined effects of the collapse of real estate prices and the disastrous bailout 
of its banking system, the Irish crisis officially began in 2010 with the country requesting support 
from both the EU and the IMF.  The financial assistance programme for Ireland was a 3-year 
rescue package totaling 85 billion EUR, with 62.5 billion EUR coming from the newly 
established EFSM and EFSF funds and 22.5 billion EUR from the IMF.  The IMF loan took the 
form of an Extended Fund Facility (EFF), in contrast to the Stand-By-Agreement (SBA) for the 
first Greek programme.  The EFF is typically used to assist countries with payment imbalances 
due to structural problems (IMF website).  In the case of Ireland, the program targets 
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“vulnerabilities in the banking system” and aims to restore market confidence and correct 
structural impediments to the business environment (Table 2) 
Portugal Overview 
 
Portugal was the third eurozone member to receive financial assistance from both the EU 
and the IMF.  Unlike other programme countries, Portugal suffered from an illusion created by 
its low interest rate environment: easy access to credit contributes to high debt levels for all 
market and non-market players.  In May 2011, Portugal began a 3-year economic adjustment 
program totaling 78 billion EUR, with 52 billion EUR coming from the EFSM and the EFSF, 
and the remaining 26 billion EUR from the IMF.  The loan was approved to help Portugal 
finance the budget and recapitalize its banks, with conditions of the government committing to a 
number of domestic reforms similar to those placed upon Greece and Ireland.  The EU official 
loans from the EFSM and the EFSF featured the same maturity as those granted to Ireland, 7.5 
years (Table 2).  
Although the financial assistance programs were quickly established, the financial 
outlook was consistently deteriorating.  Responding to the overall negative pressure, the euro 
area authorities ultimately decided to set up the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in June 
2011 (ESM Evaluation Report).  The ESM would address problems with a wide scope, ranging 
from direct intervention of the sovereign bond markets to the recapitalization of financial 
institutions.  It is worth noting that the bank recapitalization tool allowed for official support 
programmes without the IMF’s involvement. 
Greece Second Economic Adjustment Programme 
 
As the economic situation in Greece continued to worsen after its first program in May 
2010, the Greek government requested further financial assistance.  In March 2012, the EU and 
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the IMF together approved the second bailout package for Greece, a deal that is worth 130 
billion EUR and includes 53.5% debt write-down (Corsetti, Erce & Uy, 2017).  The second 
programme for Greece led to debates about sovereign debt restructuring among scholars and 
policymakers, as the bailout package required an exchange of Greece significantly reducing its 
debt-to-GDP ratio, resulting in the completion of the world’s largest restructuring deal.  On the 
EU side, the newly established EFSF provided 144.7 billion EUR, and the IMF continued its 
support for Greece with an additional 28 billion EUR in the form of Extended Fund Facility.  
While the EU loan has a maturity of 10 years, the IMF’s EFF was issued with a maturity of 8 
years (Table 1).  
 
Lending Terms Analysis 
 
Along the evolution of the build-up of a euro area infrastructure for handling the Greek, 
Irish, and Portuguese crisis, the EFSF and EFSM played a critical role.  The creation of these two 
institutions, in the midst of managing the euro area crisis and relationship with an external 
player, fundamentally changed the way programmes are funded: from direct bilateral loans to 
public guarantees on market financing.  The creation of the ESM was thus the result of this 
change, which became the main source of support for Italy and Spain as the crisis spread to more 
countries.  However, the IMF made a significant contribution to helping the euro area identify 
the dynamic of the crisis in its financial sector and addressing the challenges of each individual 
country.  The changes in lending terms for the four programmes described above could shed light 
on the IMF’s ground-breaking role in aiding the EU institutions and national authorities to 
manage the euro-area crisis.  In what follows, the paper examines the changes in lending terms 
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with data drawn mostly from “Official Sector Lending Strategies During the Euro Area Crisis” 
(Corsetti, Erce and Uy 2017). 
At the high level, the IMF programmes for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal featured a 
substantial lending facility change from SBA to EFF.  The Stand-by-Agreement (SBA) is the 
most widely used tool by the IMF since its creation in 1965, providing lower rates than what 
crisis countries would typically be able to finance from the private markets (IMF website).  
Whereas SBA addresses general financing needs and macroeconomic imbalances, EFF is 
typically used to help countries address structural problems that cause difficulties with balance of 
payments (IMF website).  The shift from SBA, which was only disbursed to Greece in the first 
economic adjustment programme, to EFF for the following three for Portugal, Ireland, and 
Greece (2nd time) indicates the IMF’s deeper understanding of the nature of the euro-area crisis.  
When the crisis first began in late 2007, the IMF followed the language of the EU institutions in 
addressing the severity of the crisis, despite the growing concerns of market participants.  In 
many of its public statements and discourses, the IMF staff commented that the area’s financial 
system remained sound and only entered a period of turmoil (IMF, 2008 Article IV 
Consultation).  However, as the crisis moved into late 2008, the IMF began to acknowledge the 
inherent vulnerabilities of the euro-area financial sector, including issues such as 
undercapitalization, funding, and asset equity (Veron, 2016).  This shift in perspective was again 
evident in the public statements that the IMF made.  For example, the Global Financial Stability 
report (GFSR) published in April 2009 highlighted the unaddressed challenges of the European 
banking sector by comparing it to that of the U.S. and Japan.  In the subsequent months, the IMF 
pressed for more stress-tests of European banks and the release of those results, effectively 
pushing the European leaders into acknowledging the nature of the crisis (Veron, 2016).  Thus, 
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the IMF’s early leading role in identifying the unaddressed challenges of the euro-area financial 
sector was monumental in shaping the European official support, which underwent a series of 
renegotiations and changes in its lending terms.   
There are a few contextual reasons that explain why it was difficult for eurozone officials 
to assess the right course of action.  First, the lack of institutional set-up for a monetary crisis 
within EMU and the lack of historical experience to learn from both resulted in the reality that 
many policies and actions had to be invented in real time.  Second, the strong interdependence 
between sovereigns and banks, without the flexibility to change exchange rates, enlarged the 
potential effects of spillover (Bruegel Blueprint).  Because of this exchange rate phenomenon, a 
further complicating factor is the fact that conditionality had to be made about structural and 
fiscal policies (Corsetti, Erce and Uy 2017). 
Bilateral loans from Greek Loan Facility lowered spread over reference rate three times 
from May 2010 to December 2012, reducing margins from 300 - 400 bps down to 50 bps (Table 
4).  Under GLF, the reference point was the floating 3-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate 
(EURIBOR).  The initial 300 - 400 bps spread charge was 100 bps over that on the IMF’s SBA 
loan for the first Greek adjustment programme.  A more salient softening of lending policy was 
the extensions of the loan maturity from 5 to 30 years, and of the grace period from 3 to 10 years.  
Interest rates on the second Greek adjustment program that began in 2012 were also lowered 
once from 150 bps over the reference point to 0 bps.  Under the loan vehicle EFSF, the reference 
rate was the cost of funding, which matched the funds raised from bill and bond sales to Greece’s 
disbursement schedule.  Loan maturity was also extended from 20 to 30 years.  Why did the 
European public sector loans change their lending terms so drastically with such favorable 
conditions for Greece?  
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The relief was due to primarily the Troika’s belief that the Greek debt was unsustainable.  
The principles of the IMF lending apply to countries whose financial distress were a result of 
illiquidity rather than insolvency.  The rationales behind such lending framework are presented 
and justified by both the official lenders and scholars over time.  For example, one reason cited 
was the need to protect taxpayer resources (Schumacher 2015).  As Greece received both loans 
from the European official sector and the IMF, there existed a need to constantly check and test 
whether such lending principles could still be upheld by the IMF.  The softening of the lending 
terms for Greece under both GFL and EFSF indicated the nature of these programs as a “quick 
fix” rather than real, sustainable solutions to address debt sustainability.  These two facilities 
were successful in circumventing the “no bailout clause,” but pointed to the need for a longer-
term commitment (Schumacher 2015).  The IMF’s lending framework on debt sustainability 
motivated the changes in lending terms for Greece to service its debt burden, as the debt 
sustainability level depends highly on the maturity and spread of official lending (Corsetti, Erce 
and Uy 2017).  The nature of GLF as bilateral loans also explains the motivation of an extension 
of loan maturity to bring down Greece’s projected financing needs at unfavorable market terms, 
preventing aggravated spillovers to other member countries.   According to the IMF country 
report on Greece published in 2013, Greece’s debt appeared to be considerably more manageable 
after adjusting for the maturity extensions on loans (IMF, 2013).  The flexibility of the lending 
vehicles and structures to lower financing costs for Greece in fact serves the purpose of reducing 
risks of default and spillover.  However, reducing interest rates for Greece in three steps also 
showcases an overall initial underestimation and misdiagnosis of the severity of the crisis.  
For Portugal and Ireland, changes in lending terms were almost paralleled.  For Ireland, 
the three-year joint programme of EUR 85 billion granted in December 2010 had the first change 
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in lending terms in July 2011 (Table 4).  The margins on the loans from the EFSF/EFSM were 
lowered from 250 bps to 0 bps and the average maturity was extended to 15 years.  This change 
coincided with the IMF Staff Report published in July 2011, which emphasized the intertwining 
issues of banks and sovereigns (IMF, 2011).  As previously discussed, the IMF took some time 
to adjust its assessment of the euro-area crisis, from making relatively positive statements of the 
financial sector’s health to pressing for stress testing of European banks.  This shift culminated in 
the identification of the bank-sovereign vicious circle (Veron, 2016).  Not only did the IMF lead 
the international conversation around this relationship, it also shaped the interpretation of the 
European institutions about the nature of the crisis.  The bank-sovereign link is a unique euro-
area feature characterized by an explicit commitment by EU leaders to provide national funding 
and capitals to respective banks, thereby establishing direct and indirect financial linkages within 
the economy (Council of the European Union, 2008).  In the context of the area’s single currency 
and single market, this bank-sovereign link can become a vicious circle between the credit 
conditions of domestic banks and the sovereign credit of their home countries.  At the time, the 
EU had not acquired this understanding of the bank-sovereign relationship.  However, the 
influence of the IMF finally appeared less than a year later in 2012, when the Euro Area Summit 
included a discussion on the bank-sovereign vicious cycle (Euro Area Summit Statement, 2012).  
According to Veron, an interview conducted with ECB officials confirmed that the IMF 
preceded and influenced the EU in identifying this relationship (Veron, 2016).  
The second change took place in May 2013, where the EU members agreed for another 
extension of weighted average maturity limit from 15 years to 22 years.  Similar to Ireland, 
Portugal also received two significant changes.  When the programme first began in May 2011, 
the loan disbursed by the EFSF/EFSM demanded a margin of 210 bps, with an average maturity 
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of 7.5 years.  The first changes in the terms were made to be aligned with those of Ireland: 
margins reduced to 0 bps and loan maturity was extended to 15 years.  In May 2013, Portugal 
was granted another maturity extension to 22 years.  As shown in Figure 1.1, the extended 
maturities of EFSF/EFSM had a positive effective on the maturity structure of debt in Portugal 
and Ireland smoothing repayment profiles and thereby reducing financing risks (ESM Evaluation 
Report).  In comparison, the debt repayment profiles graphed by Corsetti et al. in Figure 1.2 
show that debt repayment to euro sector official loans are more backloaded, second in line to the 
IMF loans. 
Further motivations of lending term changes for Ireland and Portugal differed from those 
for Greece.  The IMF, however, did not play a significant role in these later lending term changes 
for Ireland and Portugal, as it transitioned its resources into analytical work and policy advocacy 
for a European banking union (Veron, 2016).   While debt sustainability was still on the radar of 
analysis for the European institutions, helping crisis countries to access market normally seemed 
to have risen to the top of priority.  By smoothening repayments and shifting them into the 
future, the lending terms of government loans could potentially affect market expectations and 
confidence.  Corsetti et al. analyzed the yield curve of the secondary sovereign bond market with 
an event analysis around the times when lending terms changed (Corsetti, Erce & Uy, 2017).  
They found that bid-ask spreads narrowed for all maturities after the announcements of lending 
term changes for Ireland and narrowed for the 10-year maturity in the case of Portugal.  Further, 
they concluded that the announcement of the changes was accompanied by increased in the 
volumes of bond issuance in sovereign primary markets.  Combined with the narrowing of bid-
ask spreads, improvements in secondary markets translated to better access to new funding.  This 
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result directly addressed the goal of those economic adjustment programmes to lessen liquidity 
concerns. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
The European sovereign debt crisis, particularly that faced by the euro-area countries, 
presented an unprecedented challenge to the European leaders, institutions, and policymakers.  
However, the crisis gave rise to the formation of the Troika, a unique construction that allowed 
for cooperation between regional institutions and a major global financial institution.  As the 
IMF acted in coordination with the European Central Bank and European Commission with its 
country-specific programmes, it played a significant role in shaping the understanding of the 
nature of the crisis in a few aspects.  At the high level, the established lending frameworks of the 
IMF informed its European partners in the Troika the dynamics of the bank-sovereign 
relationship and motivated the euro-area to establish long-term commitment to address debt 
sustainability.  The shift of the types of IMF arrangements from shorter-term SBA to longer-term 
EFF revealed an institutional acknowledgement of the greater potential impact of the crisis.  The 
IMF lending framework on debt sustainability further motivated the euro-area lenders to account 
for the projected financing needs of programme countries, as evident in the change in Greece’s 
debt sustainability after the loan extension.  Last but not the least, the IMF was the leader in 
identifying the bank-sovereign link and the potential vicious circle that the European nations 
were in.  By contributing its resources into analytical research and advocating for an emphasis on 
the need of the financial sector, the IMF appropriately led its European partners to realize the 
urgency of the situations in Ireland and Portugal.   
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The three Troika programmes discussed in this paper are atypical IMF programmes 
because of their longer durations, size of loans, and cooperation with other financial institutions.   
The outcome of the EFSF and other smaller euro-area official support was generally regarded to 
be successful, paving the road to the subsequent design and implementation of the European 
Stability Mechanism.  This learning and adjustment process for the European institutions was 
well captured by the changes of the lending terms, in the context of the critical role that the IMF 
played in facilitating the understanding of the crisis.  
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VIII. Appendix 
 
Table 1 Greece Programmes Overview 
 
Table 2 Ireland Programme Overview 
 
Table 3 Portugal Programme Overview 
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Table 4 
Source: 
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Aitor Erce, and Timothy Uy. “Official Sector Lending Strategies During the 
Euro Area Crisis.” Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM), 2017. 
https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1720. 
 
Figure 1.1: Loan Maturity Structure Prior to and After Extensions 
Source: ESM Evaluation Report Figure 4.2 
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Figure 1.2: Irish Debt Repayment Profile by Creditor Type 
Source: Corsetti, Giancarlo, Aitor Erce, and Timothy Uy. “Official Sector Lending 
Strategies During the Euro Area Crisis.” Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM), 2017. 
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Figure 2.1 Greece EFSF Blended Rate 
Graph made by author from data compiled by Corsetti, Giancarlo, and Uy 
 
Figure 2.2 Portugal EFSF Blended Rate 
Graph made by author from data compiled by Corsetti, Giancarlo, and Uy 
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Figure 2.3 Ireland EFSF Blended Rate 
Graph made by author from data compiled by Corsetti, Giancarlo, and Uy 
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